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In these sixteen cases in which there was a claim to complete
immunity from the tax,55 the claim was sustained in eight cases,
four from state courts and four from federal district courts, all
of which correctly anticipated what the Supreme Court would do.
Four of the cases allow special taxes on natural resources or their
extraction,56 when the tax impinges before transportation begins.
They are to be contrasted with the cases which forbid the police
power of the state to apply to sales which are technically com-
pleted by delivery within the state.57  Such a sale, when delivery
is to a carrier for shipment to a foreign buyer from the American
purchaser, is held a sale for export,58 and it might be held that
the commerce clause alone would protect such a sale from state
taxation. It is seriously to be doubted, however, whether sales
to a grain elevator could claim exemption from taxation because
the elevator soon after ships to points outside the state. It seems
It may be thought arbitrary to include in this group the cases raising the
issue whether the measure of the excise was the gross receipts from interstate
transportation or interstate sale rather than net income from interstate transpor-
tation and gross receipts from production, since a favorable answer might still
leave the taxpayer subject to part of the tax in issue. A captious critic might
make the same comment on the inclusion in this section of the cases involving
remunerative inspection fees. It has, however, been thought more convenient
to isolate these issues of taxability from the other facts in the cases and thus to
present as distinct questions whether the oil sales were immune, whether the
assessment of net railroad operating income was invalid as an assessment of
gross corporate income, and whether the state court had in fact confused re-
ceipts from interstate sales with values at the well.
In the section to follow in which issues of the quantum of the tax are con-
sidered, some of the cases reaffirm settled points of taxability. They show that
an excise on the privilege of being a corporation may be imposed by the char-
tering state though the corporate business is exclusively interstate commerce,
that property which derives its value partly from interstate commerce may enter
into the assessment of an excise on doing local business, and that gross receipts
from interstate commerce may be taxed if the demand is a fair substitute for a
property tax.
"Cases cited in notes 12, 14, x6 and 53, supra.
"Supra note z7.
' Supra note 13.
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likely that the court is working toward a distinction between state
police power and state taxing power in the state of origin, similar
to the distinction applied to the state of destination. Now that
the Supreme Court has recovered from the confusion that pre-
ceded the Sonneborn case,50 it is clear that upon the ending of
transit a state may tax the sale of goods which have come in from
other states, though that sale is safeguarded by the commerce
clause from most exercises of state police power. It looks as
though the state of origin will find that the commerce clause con-
demns the clasp of its police power where it still condones the
embrace of a tax. This, however, is not explicitly established
by the cases involving the extraction of natural products, for this
is one step more remote from transportation than are sales and
deliveries of those products to a purchaser within the state.
There is good reason for allowing the state to tax interstate
commerce which it may not regulate. There is no good reason
why interstate commerce should be exempt from taxes which
other commerce bears. The court recognizes this when it allows
the state to tax the net income from railroad operations within its
borders 60 and to make motor vehicles contribute to the main-
tenance of the highways which they use.61 The state protects
interstate commerce as it protects other enterprise. For this pro-
tection and consequent expense the state should have remunera-
tion. The highway tax on motor vehicles presents the point in
striking fashion, but the case for general taxation of all commerce
is almost equally clear. The contrast between police power and
taxation is manifest. The police-power issue is whether the regu-
lation is one that should come from the states or from Congress.
While conceivably we might have the same issue with respect to
taxation, Congress is not likely to put special taxes on interstate
or foreign commerce other than duties on imports. Congress
taxes other enterprise along with interstate commerce and the
states must be allowed to tax interstate commerce along with other
enterprise. To give to interstate commerce an immunity from
' Supra note 31.
' Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Daughton, supra note 51.1 Clark v. Poor, supra note 46.
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that which competing local commerce must bear is to give it a
preference which no wise silence in the Constitution could be
thought to command.
The danger to interstate commerce is that the states may
manage to tax it more heavily than local commerce. The burden
of the argument against the taxes on ore and coal and furs was
that these were picked for special taxes because the incidence of
such special taxes would be preponderantly on consumers in other
states. This did not meet with the favor of the court. The
taxes were technically on something local, as was the excise on
the intrastate business of the commission merchants, 62 and the
court saw grave danger to the taxing systems of the states if
local enterprise were t6 be exempted because it was an antecedent
to extra-state consumption. This fear would be more compelling
if the state taxes had been general ones. There is something to
be said against picking for special burdens an enterprise or com-
modity of chief concern to persons in other states. If such selec-
tiveness be scotched, the state still has its general property tax
and its general net-income tax. Yet there are considerations in
favor of special taxes on turning coal and ore and gas and skins
into money, and it would have been going a great way to use the
commerce clause as a censor of state production taxes merely
because the taxes were special rather than general, and because
the greater part of the burden could be shifted to persons at the
other end of subsequent interstate transportation.
The eight cases in which state taxes were condemned suggest
that the commerce clause does not yet speak with clarity to infe-
rior courts. The only case in which the lower court correctly
imagined the future thoughts of its superior was the one which
saved an oil concern from high inspection fees; 63 and if the sales
in this case, as seems likely, were in whole or in part made after
the interstate transit had ended, the immunity lasted only two
months before it was cancelled by the Sonneborn- case.64 The
District Court in this case correctly read the past mind of the
Raley & Brothers v. Richardson, supra note 36.
Phipps v. Cleveland Refining Co., supra note 33.
*' Supra note 31.
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Supreme Court but not its future mind, For the moment, the
Supreme Court itself was in the same situation. The other seven
cases involved one reversal of a District Court, one of a Circuit
Court of Appeals and five of state courts. The Pennsylvania reg-
tlation of brokers of steamship tickets "' was not a fiscal measure
and the fee would doubtless have been sustained if the police
requirements had been deemed appropriate. The stocking sales-
men 63 were clearly engaged exclusively in interstate commerce,
and the Circuit Court of Appeals should not be astonished that
the Supreme Court found that the method by which the solicitors
received their compensation did not turn an interstate sale into a
local one.
The two cases on state taxation of goods in transit 67 turned
on particularities which the state courts viewed with different eyes
from the Supreme Court. Both of them were close cases even
though the Supreme Court was unanimous. The decisions of such
close cases should be influenced by the substantial importance of
the underlying canon that goods in course of interstate transit are
immune from state taxation. The only good' practical reason
why the state of origin should lose its tax is that other states with
other tax days may levy another. tax before the end of the year.
If this should h:ppen, property would be subject to cumulative
taxes because it moves frcm state to state. There is no protection
against this, hcwever, if the property halts in its transit for some
independent local advantage, s and it is hard to find the case any
stronger for the tv::payer if the products gc uninterruptedly to
their ultimate dest~nation, and then encounter the possibility of a
tax within less than a year from the tax in the state of origin.
There is every reason for -viewing the facts favorably to the state
of origin, even though they be vieixed strictly against an inter-
mediate state or the state cf ultimate destination. As the canon
is now applied, it is pcssible for products to set forth on a journey
before tax day and thus escape taxation entirely. In favor of
'Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, supra paote 41.
'Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, supra note 38.
'Cases cited in notes 18 and 20, siupra.
'sBacon v, Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 (1913), and other cases discussed in
Powell, Ta~ration of Things in Transit (1920) 7 VA, L. REv. 177-I9.
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such a result there are only doctrinal considerations, and even
these do not seem strong when the doctrine is not applied to
vehicles 9 if the state satisfies itself with a fair estimate of the
average that may be deemed to be within its borders through the
year.
The three remaining cases involved occupation or franchise
taxes on enterprises engaged exclusively in interstate commerce.
The doctrine had long been clear that such taxes are not to be
allowed. Since the doctrine was first laid down, however, the
Supreme Court had established that property employed in inter-
state commerce and net income from such commerce are taxable,
and it had retreated from earlier positions and held that a tax
nominally on doing intrastate commerce will be deemed a tax on
interstate commerce if it be so measured as to impose an ill-
advised burden on that commerce. If the court can thus look
through form to substance to find a tax to condemn, it should be
able to look through form to substance to find a tax to condone.
The two excises on doing business in corporate form 70 were so
general that there was no danger that interstate commerce would
be picked for special burdens. Both would have been sustained
if the taxpayer had done a small amount of independent local
business. So far as we yet know, both would have been sustained
if the taxes had technically been imposed, not on doing business,
but on the value of the capital stock and surplus employed in the
taxing state, or on a combination of the corporate surplus em-
ployed in the taxing state and the net income derived from busi-
ness within the taxing state. Since, however, the taxes were not
property taxes on these values, but were excise taxes on doing
business merely measured by these values, they are bad taxes
when the business done is exclusively interstate. If the silence
of the Constitution commands such formalism, it is a more rigid
silence than some of us supposed.
For the New Orleans occupation tax on the steamship
'American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (I899) ; Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. i49 (igoo).
T Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, supra note 42; Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, supra note 43.
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agency 71 there is less to be said. The city had gone about pick-
ing various occupations for special taxes, and had thereby adopted
a device that might operate to burden interstate enterprise more
heavily than enterprise generally. The court could hardly invite
the trouble of satisfying itself in each individual case whether the
particular tax before it is matched by proportionate taxes on all
other enterprise. This difficulty and this danger are obviated
when a state imposes a general excise on all corporate business.
The spread of such a tax is sufficiently wide to calm all fears that
interstate commerce will pay more than its fair share to the public
fisc. Where the measure of the excise is net income from busi-
ness within the state, the income from interstate commerce may
be included if there be other income as well. So far as we know,
a tax that calls itself a tax on net income can apply to net income
from interstate commerce though the recipient is engaged exclu-
sively in interstate commerce. If a bad measure invalidates a
tax on a traditionally good subject, substance should be able to
vanquish form and secure the sanction of a tax measured by net
income, even though the tax calls itself one on doing business and
it chances that the only business done by the particular taxpayer
is interstate commerce.
II. ISSUES OF THE QUANTUM OF THE TAX
Owing to the earlier notion that excises on domestic corpo-
rations and on the intrastate activities of foreign corporations
may be measured as the state chooses, corporations combining
interstate and local commerce invoked the commerce clause to
escape from burdens that the Fourteenth Amendment had not
been found to forbid. The judicial sanction given to such
commerce-clause complaints has made that clause an arbiter of
issues of jurisdiction and discrimination, though such issues are
intrinsically ones of due process and of the equal protection of the
laws. Judicial declariations indicate that the old notion of arbi-
trary power over corporations has been abandoned and that
excises on these quondam pariahs must now meet the test of the
'Texas Transport Co. v. New Orleans, supra note 39.
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Fourteenth Amendment. There is still, a possibility, however,
that the commerce clause may exercise a stricter censorship than
the Fourteenth Amendment alone, as it apparently does with
respect to service of process and garnishment. So long as we
do not know that there is no divergence between the protection
accorded under the one clause and the other, cases fought under
the banner of the commerce clause should enter into the annals of
the doings of that clause.
It is so firmly settled that a gross-receipts tax in lieu of a
property tax may be applied to receipts from interstate transpor-
tation that the complainant in Pullman Co. v. Richardson 2 could
hardly have been surprised at its failure to recover back such part
of the tax paid as was assessed on the interstate receipts allocated
to the state. The allocation was on a mileage basis, but the mile-
age ratio was applied to the actual receipts from transportation
partly within the taxing state, so that the state did not assume that
the cars did as much business over one mile as over another, but
only that the actual payment for an actual journey could be appor-
tioned according to the mileage actually traveled. A contention
that the commerce clause was violated by a provision that a for-
eign corporation which fails to pay the tax should be excluded
from doing business was set aside because not involved in a suit
to recover back part of a tax actually paid. It was laid down
that such a provision could not be applied to exclusion from inter-
state commerce. There was no contention that the tax was rela-
tively higher than ordinary property taxes, so the case fell within
the familiar sanction of gross-receipts taxes in lieu of property
taxes, as taxes on property measured by gross receipts from the
use thereof.
The complaint unsuccessfully advanced in Schwab v. Rich-
ardson 73 was that California, by measuring an excise tax on the
I 261 U. S. 330 (1923). Other applications of the unit rule to Pullman
cars are treated in (923) 71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 17o and (1923) 2 Wis. L. REv.
17'.
n'263 U. S. 88 (1923). See (1924) 12 CALF. L. REV. 516; (1924) 22
MicH. L. REv. 496; and (1924) 10 VA. L. REV. 330. For discussions of similar
problems see Nelson, Valuation of Property Employed in Interstate Commerce,
12 Bull. Nat. Tax Ass'n 30; and a note in (1926) IO MARQ. L. R~v. 95, dis-
cussing an excise measured by property.
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franchise of a domestic corporation based on that proportion of
the so-called corporate excess which the business within the state
bears to the total business, was imposing an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce because the value of the capital
stock was due in large part to earnings from interstate commerce
and to property outside the state. Obviously the property Oiitside
the state lost its significance when the value of all tangible prop-
erty everywhere was deducted from the value of the capital stock
to determine the total "corporate excess." It seems aiso that the
earnings from interstate commerce outside the state were put out
of the reckoning when the state board took only that proportion
of the corporate excess which the business within the state bore
to the total business. There is nothing in Mr. Justice McKenna's
opinion to indicate that this self-denial on the part of the state
was necessary and there is a hint to the contrary in his reference
to the fact that the taxation here exercised was upon intangible
property and that the case is therefore free "from the perplexity
of a consideration of situs which may beset tangible property." 71
Of course the earnings from interstate commerce contributed to
the assessment. This has been sanctioned many times when ex-
cises have been allowed to take account of a valuation of capital
stock which arises from a capitalizatiori of earning power. This
company's transportation business was exclusively between Cali-
fornia and extra-California ports. It was, however, a domestic
corporation. "The state," observes the opinion, "has taxed the
right which it granted, and which it was competent to tax." 75
For the vice of assessment based on extraterritorial values,
an excise on a foreign corporation doing both intrastate and inter-
state business was held an invalid regulation of interstate com-




To266 U. S. 71 (1924). See Crandall, Constitutionality of the Franchise
Tax Provisions of the Illinois Corporation Act (1925) 19 ILL_ L. REV. 533;
and notes in (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 3313; (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV. 361, 4O5;
and (1925) 34 YATz L. J. 55o. For consideration of analogous issues, see
Isaacs, The Unit Rule (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 838; Wickersham, Taxation of
No Par Value Stock (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 289; and note (1927) 13 VA. L.
REv. i85.
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Ohio based its fee on the proportion of authorized capital stock
represented by property owned and business transacted in Ohio.
The state commission had treated sales from Ohio stock to pur-
chasers in other states as Ohio business. The Federal District
Court revised the assessment so as to allocate to Ohio no part of
the business of making interstate sales from Ohio stock. The
Supreme Court did not directly pass on the necessity or the pro-
priety of this revision, but declared the statute unconstitutional
because it applied its rate to a proportion of authorized shares
instead of to a proportion of shares issued and outstanding. As
Mr. Justice Butler puts it:
"All plaintiff's business, intrastate and interstate, and
all its property wherever located were represented by the
50,485 shares of stock outstanding. The annual fee de-
manded by the state officers is five cents per share on 4oo,000
shares, and that fixed by the lower court is based on 298,520
shares. The inevitable effect of the act is to tax and directly
burden interstate commerce of foreign corporations per.-
mitted to do business in Ohio, and engaged in interstate com-
merce, wherever the number of shares authorized, subject to
the charge of five cents each, exceeds the number of shares
attributable to or represented by the corporation's property
and business in that state. In this case, the fee fixed by the
commission was based on nearly eight times the number of
outstanding shares and that determined by the court on
nearly six times that number. As some of the outstanding
shares are represented by plaintiff's interstate business, the
application of the rate to all the shares, or to a number
greater than the total outstanding, necessarily amounts to a
tax and direct burden upon all the property and business in-
cluding the interstate commerce of the plaintiff. .
We hold that the act violates the commerce clause.
' 77
Since in this case the company had no property outside of
Ohio, relief under the commerce clause must have been predicated
upon an undue burden on the interstate sales from Ohio stock.
We are left in doubt, however, whether it would have been proper
to allocate to Ohio some or all of the business of sales from Ohio
to other states, or whether this interstate business must be wholly
1266 U. S. 71, 82-83 (1924).
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excluded from the numerator of Ohio business and left in the
denominator of total business as was ordered by the District
Court. 78 If the allocation were wholly on the basis of business,
the assessment would take toll of extraterritorial profits if it did
not accord some recognition to the fact that some customers were
outside of the taxing state, since to make profits there must be
buyers to buy as well as goods to sell. If any part of the inter-
state business be allocated to the taxing state, there is assessment
of profits arising from interstate commerce. Yet it seems absurd
to call this a vice under the commerce clause when the state is
allowed to disregard the proportion of business and to adopt the
ratio of property within the state to property everywhere. Had
the fee in the present case been a percentage of the actual value
of the stock outstanding, it should, under a prior decision,79 have
been held proper, since all the property was in Ohio. The flat
rate of five cents on any proportion of merely authorized shares,
irrespective of the number issued and of their value, is so unre-
lated to either property or business in the taxing state that we
might expect condemnation without inquiry as to the actual bur-
den imposed in any particular case. 0 In the present case it was
condemned as a violation of the equal-protection clause as well
as an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce.
No vice of assessment of extra-territorial income was found
""The question where an income is earned is always a matter of doubt
where the business is begun in one country and ended in another," says Mr.
Chief Justice Taft in Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442, 450 (925).
" Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290 (1922), reviewed
in (1922) 2x MIcr. L. RE V. 174, 196-197.
' Such a tax of five cents per share on such proportion of the authorized
shares of no-par stock as is represented by business transacted and property
located in the state was sustained in Roberts & Schaeffer Co. v. Emmerson, 271
U. S. 50 (1926), as validly imposed by the state in which the corporation is
chartered. The privilege of issuing stock was said to be one derived, from the
state of incorporation, which differentiates a tax by the state of incorporation
from a tax by another state. The company before the court did no business
outside its home state and did not adduce the commerce clause, so it possibly
may still be an open question whether domestic corporations engaged in inter-
state commerce may be subjected to franchise taxes measured by authorized
rather than by issued capital stock, but as the cases cited in support of the
ruling were commerce-clause cases, it is to be anticipated that the home state
would find the commerce clause as clement as the Fourteenth Amendment. The
case also sustained a flat fee per share on no-par stock, although the tax on
corporations issuing par-value stock varies with the value or price at which the
stock is issued.
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by the court in Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commi t
sion,81 although it was recognized as possible that under the New
York law there might be a New York tax although there was no
New York income. The tax was said by Mr. Justice Sanford to
be "not a direct tax upon the allocated income of the corporation
in a given year, but a tax for the privilege of doing business in
one year measured by the allocated income accruing from the
business in the preceding year". " 2 The complainant made ale in
England and had in 1918 branches in New York. Its sales were
both intrastate and interstate. The major feature of New York's
method of estimating the New York proportion of the total in-
come consists in taking the ratio of the average monthly value of
real and tangible personal property in New York plus the average
monthly value of bills and accounts receivable for goods and serv-
ices made or rendered in New York, on the one hand; to the
corresponding values everywhere, on the otber hand. The court
found in this nothing "inherently arbitrary or a mere effort to
reach profits earned elsewhere under the guise of legitimate tax-
ation." 13 Average monthly values were held to be as proper as
an annual value. It was said not to matter that the company
may not have made throughout the United States a net income
under the provisions of the federal law, since this does not show
that no income was derived from the New York part of the busi-
ness. Mr. Justice Sanford goes still further when he says:
"Furthermore, the statutory method of apportionment
not being shown to be arbitrary or unreasonable, we think
that the Court of Appeals rightly held that the tax imposed
for the carrying on of the business in New York is not in-
valid merely because in the preceding year the business con-
ducted in New York may have yielded no net income. There
is no sufficient reason why a foreign corporation desiring to
81266 U. S. 271 (1924). See (1925) 23 MIcH. L. REv. 549 and (1925)
34 YALE L. J. 335. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissents. This case and others in
this section are discussed in the article by Powell, supra note 44.
A commerce-clause complaint against alleged assessment of extraterritorial
values was left unconsidered in Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 266
U. S. 265 (1924), because the taxpayer had failed to avail itself of the admin-




continue the carrying on cf business in the state for another
year-from which it expects to derive-a benefit-should be
relieved of a privilege tax because it did not happen to have
made any profit during the preced'ng year. This is espe-
cially true where, as in the present case, the corporation is
entirely relieved of any personal property tax." S4
The last sentence is followed by a citation of a case sustain-
ing a gross receipts tax as one in lieu of a property tax.8s Thus
it appears that the court will look more leniently on possible
defects in a method of allocating income when the state has
exempted from taxation some of the property that it might have
taxed. In this case the company apparently presented no evi-
dence to show that the allocation produced an unwarranted result,
but contented itself with objections to the method applied. One
further objection related to the additional elements in the New
York ratio which apportioned stocks of cther corporations owned
by the taxpayer according to the location of the physical property
of such second corporations, but which limited the values of such
stocks to ten per cent of the value of the real and tangible personal
property of the owning and taxpaying corporation. Mr. Justice
Sanford in one part of his opinion says of this that "in the present
case the inclusion of a portion of the shares of stock in other
corporations-none of which were allocated to New York, re-
sulted in the Company's favor, and reduced the income allocated
to New York to less than it otherwise would have been." s6 This
must be taken as a refusal to consider in the case at bar whether
it is proper thus to look through the corporate entity and in a
measure treat the corporation as the owner of a share of the prop-
erty of another corporation of which it is a stockholder. "S The
ten per cent limitation had been held invalid by the New York
"Ibid. at 284.
'United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 233 U. S. 335 (1914).
Supra note 81 at 283.
In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Daughton, 27o U. S. 69 (1926), it
was held that property in the state belonging to a foreign corporation affords
no basis for an inheritance tax on the transfer of shares owned by a non-
resident decedent. On the question whether this would be applied in the case
of an excise tax on a corporation measured in part by the property of subsidi-
aries, see infra note 89. In (1927) 25 MicH. L. REv. 278 is a note on foreign
corporations taxed on the business of subsidiaries.
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court in another case.88 It had apparently been applied in the
case at bar, but the Supreme Court overlooked it for the pro-
cedural reasons that it did not appear that the shares of stock
had yielded any dividends included in its total income, and that
the record failed to show that the company had made specific
objection to the ten per cent limitation before the state commis-
sion or the state cour.8 9
The chief complaints advanced by certain railroads against
the North Carolina property tax and the North Carolina excise
tax sustained in Southern Railway v. Watts 90 were that the valu-
ations were excessive both absolutely and relatively as compared
with non-railroad property. These complaints were held to be
unsupported by the facts. Of the property tax Mr. Justice Bran-
deis said that "there was no taxation of interstate commerce" and
"there is not shown any taxation of property without the State." 91
The franchise tax he approved with the comments:
"Nor is there any basis for the claim that the franchise
tax act violates the commerce clause. The tax appears to be
upon the privilege of doing an intrastate business. . .
It is not of the character which is held a burden upon inter-
state commerce. . . . Payment of the tax is not made a
condition precedent to granting a railroad permission to do
"Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202 (1920).
'8 Since the assessment of extraterritorial values is a vice under the com-
merce clause as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment, mention may here
be made of Southern Railway v. Kentucky, 274 U. S. 76 (927), noted in
(1927) 41 HARV. L. REV. 227, which found the Fourteenth Amendment violated
by an assessment of franchise taxes which allocated to the taxing state more
of the "corporate excess" of the taxpayer than the court found justified. There
was clearly an excessive allocation if the court was right in thinking that the
tax was claimed in respect of only one subsidiary with 127 miles of road in the
state, since the state had taken the ratio of 424 miles to the total mileage of
the system. There is a grave question as to whether Mr. Justice Butler for the
majority did not misunderstand the case advanced on behalf of the state. The
question of allocation had not been raised in the state court, the only objection
there being that the tax was wholly invalid because the taxpayer was not doing
business in the state and because the subsidiary lines there were not so con-
nected with the system as to be part of a unit with it. The Supreme Court
does not reverse the state court on this ground and by failing to do so seems
to establish that a foreign corporation owning no railroad in the taxing state
can nevertheless be subjected to a franchise tax measured by an allocation of
"corporate excess," if it owns and controls subsidiary corporations which oper-
ate lines within the state as part of the system of the parent corporation.
26o U. S. Sig ('923).
"Ibid. at 527.
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interstate business. . . And there is no basis for the
contention that the aggregate burden imposed by the prop-
erty tax, the franchise tax, and the income tax, operates to
obstruct interstate commerce." 92
The franchise tax was measured by the company's property
within the state. In denying a complaint under the equal-
protection clause premised on the notion that railroads had to pay
two property taxes where others paid but one, Mr. Justice
Brandeis observed that "a privilege tax is not converted into a
property tax because it is measured by the value of property." 93
The principle that a state may not impose as a condition prec-
edent to engaging in interstate commerce, the securing of a license,
or the acquisition of a domicil, was invoked by a foreign tank-car
corporation in General American Tank Car Corporation v. Day,
9 4
in support of a complaint that non-residents were taxed more
grievously than residents and that this constituted indirect pres-
sure to become domiciled in the taxing state. Without denying
the constitutional right to invoke such a principle or the appli-
cability of the principle to taxes discriminating against non-
residents engaged in interstate commerce, Mr. Justice Stone sent
the complainant away comfortless because he could not find that
the discrimination in fact existed. There was no objection to
the valuation of the complainant's property employed within the
state and the only question was whether the 25-mill state tax
imposed on the property of non-residents was relatively in excess
of the local taxes imposed on residents. Estimates of the com-
plainant that the local taxes averaged only 21 mills were regarded
as conjectural, and it was pointed out that even a four-mill varia-
tion in a single year would not, in the absence of a clear intention
to discriminate, be deemed an unconstitutional discrimination.
This was the only case during the October, 1925, Term in which
the commerce clause was adduced against a state tax.
In these six quarrels over assessments, the taxpayer was
victor in only one. This victory deprives the states of capacity
"Ibid. at 530.
0 Ibid.
9"270 U. S. 367 (1926).
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to measure excises on foreign corporations by a proportion of
authorized, as distinguished from issued, capital. It casts doubt
on the use of a flat rate on no-par stock irrespective of its value.
The issue had not been passed upon before, and the District
Court did not anticipate the decision of the Supreme Court. Of
the other five cases in which the assessments were sustained, three
affirmed state courts and two affirmed federal district courts.
The ill-success of the taxpayers suggests that the Supreme Court
is not likely to overturn assessments unless it can find something
to condemn in the rule under which they are made. That this
is recognized by taxpayers or their attorneys may be inferred
from the fact that only six of them went to the Supreme Court in
five years. There were only twenty-two cases during the quin-
quennium in which the commerce clause was invoked against state
taxation. This small number indicates that much of the law is
settled, even though from the seven instances in which the Su-
preme Court granted relief which lower courts had denied we
may infer that unsettled questions perennially protrude themselves
and find no certain answers until the last word is spoken by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
